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Introduction 
The Tennessee state constitution has existed for well over a century with 
almost no significant changes. While many may attribute this long-lasting continuity 
to a sound and well-written constitution, close inspection reveals various problems. 
While Tennessee's constitution is better than many states in a number of different 
areas, there are still dozens of areas which many agree need to be changed. Why, 
then, have only a small handful of changes ever been made? My explanation for the 
continuation of Tennessee's flawed constitution centers on the state's cumbersome 
amendment process. Since 1870, the amendment process of Tennessee's constitution 
has continually slowed the progress and damaged the efficiency of the state's 
government. 
In this paper I will discuss the numerous steps that a proposed amendment 
must endure. I will show how this process has changed through Tennessee's three 
constitutions. Along with an examination and explanation of the process, I intend to 
show the immense difficulty involved in each step of changing the state's supreme 
law. I will also show how the difficulty of the amendment process in Tennessee has 
created problems for the state's government. The inability to create constitutional 
change has hamstrung the state legislature by binding them to overly particular 
provisions in the constitution. Tennessee's inability to amend the constitution has 
created a judicial branch with almost no threat of its power being checked. Instead of 
protecting the basic democratic idea of majority rule with minority rights, the 
amendment process in Tennessee creates a breeding ground for minority subversion 
of the majority will. 
In addition to showing how the amendment process in Tennessee has helped 
cause a variety of problems, I will also show how a simplified amendment process 
can remedy those problems. A simplified process should allow for the necessary 
change to adequately balance the power between the three branches as well as remedy 
many of the problems faced by overly particular provisions contained in the 
Tennessee constitution. The key to my proposal for inlproving upon the amendment 
process will be in the reaching of an adequate level of difficulty to allow for change 
but preserve constitutional integrity and supremacy. 
Ultimately, Tennessee's amending procedures are too difficult and they affect 
the state in a multitude of negative ways. Until the problem is recognized, studied, 
and solved, the state is destined for a mixture ofjudicial and minority rule. For the 
state to achieve progress and maximize the efficiency of government, changes must 
be made to the state constitution, starting with the amendment provision. 
History 
To fully understand Tennessee's amendment process, its difficulty, and the 
problems it creates, one must first examine the history of the anlendment process. 
Tennessee's original method of amendment came with the state's first constitution in 
1796. From the constitution's adoption until its redrafting in 1835, there was only one 
method for amendment. This original means of constitutional change was by 
convention only. The approach first required that the question of a convention be 
called for by the state legislature. To pass the legislature, the resolution calling for the 
convention required a two-thirds majority in both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate. After this approval by the state legislature, the proposal required a 
majority vote by the people voting for representatives. This extremely difficult style 
of constitutional amendment was only successful once, in 1834, which led to 
Tennessee's second constitution. 1 
1 Laska, Lewis L. The Tennessee State Constitution: A Reference Guide. Greenwood Press: 1990. 
In the second constitution, which was drafted in 1835, the amendment process 
changed dramatically. With such little success from the convention method in the 
first 40 years of the state's existence, no provision for a convention was included in 
the second constitution. Instead of constitutional convention, the new amendment 
process allowed for individual amendments to be proposed.2 Though created as an 
alternative to the highly unsuccessful convention approach, this new method was 
difficult as well. Tennessee's first single amendment process was largely the same as 
it is today. First, an amendment was proposed by one of the two Houses of the 
General Assembly. After being addressed in the appropriate committees, it was then 
addressed by the entire Senate or House. In each respective house, the resolution had 
to be read aloud three separate times on three separate days. Passage of the resolution 
by the General Assembly required a simple majority in both houses. If a resolution 
succeeded, it moved on to the second phase. 
A proposed amendment was less than halfway through the process after being 
approved by the General Assembly. Next, the amendment was published at least six 
months prior to the election of the next General Assembly. The next General 
Assembly then would address the resolution all over again. Requirements for passage 
in the second assembly were tougher than the first. Once again, the resolution was 
subjected to the committee system and to the requirement of three readings. The 
difference between the assemblies was that the second General Assembly had to 
approve the measure by a super majority. The approval by two-thirds of all members 
in both the Senate and the House then sent the resolution to the final step. 
Once clearing the second assembly, the proposal was placed on the ballot for 
public ratification as prescribed by the General Assembly. To successfully become an 
2 Ibid. 
amendment, the proposal had to achieve "a vote equal to a majority of all those voting 
for representatives.,,3 Amendments could not be proposed by the legislature more 
often than once in six years. This single amendment method, which was successful 
only twice, would remain the only amendment process, until the drafting of 
Tennessee's current constitution in 1870.4 
With the third drafting of Tennessee's constitution came the combining of 
the two amendment methods. Since 1870, the two amendment processes have 
remained almost exactly the same. The convention method that exists today is an 
eased version of the 1796 process. Currently, the provision requires that a question 
calling for a constitutional convention be submitted to the people at the time of any 
general election. To propose a convention to the people, a bill must be passed by a 
simple majority in both houses of the legislature. Once submitted to the people, a 
simple majority of votes on the issue calls for the convention. The only change since 
1870 to the amendment process occurred due to state Supreme Court decisions in 
1949 and 1975. In the case Cummings v. Beeler in 1949, the court decided that the 
legislature could allow for either an open or limited constitutional convention. 5 
Another case in 1975 further defined the limited convention by restricting convention 
calls to sections of the constitution so as to prevent too narrowly defined limitations in 
a convention.6 As the process stands now, limited conventions only allow for 
amendment to specific sections as proposed to the people by the legislature. The 
convention, if approved by the people, would then take the next step and elect 
delegates at the next general election. Those delegates would then meet and could 
change part or all of the constitution, depending upon the convention called for by the 
3 Combs, William H. and William E. Cole. Tennessee: A Political Study. University of Tennessee 

Press: 1940. 

4 Laska, The Tennessee State Constitution, 11-14. 

5 Ibid, 19. 

6 Ibid, 23. 

legislature and voted upon by the public at large. Any changes made by the delegates 
at the convention require a simple majority. These conventions, according to the 
constitution, may only take place once every six years.7 
The legislative method, though less often used in Tennessee history, is the 
process most commonly associated with amending the constitution. This method has 
only slightly changed since its drafting in 1870 and is almost an exact mirror of the 
1834 process. Like the single amendment process of 1834, to successfully amend the 
Tennessee constitution through this legislative method a multitude of steps must take 
place. In fact, the current process replicates its predecessor exactly until the popular 
vote stage. Once approved by two General Assemblies, a resolution is placed on the 
ballot during the next gubernatorial election. The stipulation of a gubernatorial 
election was due to an amendment that was passed in the 1952 convention. The 
amendment traded the restriction of amendments being offered only once every six 
years for the gubernatorial election restriction. This effectively held the proposal of 
amendments to the public at a four-year restraint instead of six. If, at the 
gubernatorial election, a majority of those who vote for the office of governor also 
vote to approve the amendment, it becomes an amendment to the Tennessee state 
constitution.8 
Even with two possible processes to amend the constitution, Tennessee's 
amendment process is nearly impossible. The difficulty of both processes is the main 
reason that the 1870 constitution remained unamended for 83 years, until 1953, 
"which is apparently the longest period such a document has ever stood unamended 
anywhere in the world.,,9 In all, 31 amendments have been added to the state's 
constitution. Of the amendments, only four have successfully used the legislative 
7 http://www.tncrimlaw.com/1aw/constitIXLhtml 
8 Laska, Tennessee Constitutional History. 19. 
9 http://www.answers.com/toRi c/tennessee-state-constituti on 
amendment method. Successive constitutional conventions every six years from 1953 
through 1977 were responsible for the other amendments. to By 1943, the average 
state had more than 50 amendments whereas Tennessee had none. 11 What about the 
amending processes makes Tennessee's constitution so difficult to change? To 
answer the question, one must inspect each portion of the processes and the 
difficulties that are contained therein. 
The Process 
When examining the processes by which the constitution may be amended, the 
convention method has proven to be significantly easier. Even this method is not 
simple, however. As previously discussed, the first step in the convention method is 
for the legislature to pass a bill seeking to call a convention. Though this is not 
difficult, it is impractical. Due to Tennessee's part-time legislature, many legislators 
are reluctant to spend time away from their main profession for likely intense, unpaid, 
legislative duties. Though the state could possibly allocate payment to delegates, or 
select those outside the members of the General Assembly as delegates, neither of 
these options is likely. The continuing difficulty many states experience with their 
budgets, combined with constant political pressure from the public, makes payment to 
delegates unlikely. The likelihood that either party would risk convention delegates 
outside of the existing legislative makeup is also low. Another problem that exists 
with initiating a constitutional convention stems from the restriction of only one 
convention every six years. With growing economic problems in the state, many 
legislators are hesitant to call for a convention when one may be needed at any time to 
deal with vital taxation matters. 
10 Tennessee Legislative Library Documents. 

11 Papers on Constitutional Revision. University of Tennessee Bureau of Public Administration: 1947. 

Though simply starting the process of a constitutional convention is likely the 
biggest obstacle in this method, there are other hurdles that may arise. Even a 
convention proposal that successfully survives the legislature may be declined by the 
public at large for fear of unwanted or unnecessary change by politicians. Only once, 
in 1834, have the voters of Tennessee approved an open convention. The public has 
been much more open since the creation of the limited convention, approving a total 
of five consecutive conventions from 1953 through 1977.12 Should the public 
approve of the call for a convention, the changes still must be made by elected 
delegates. The simple majority required to pass an amendment in the convention is 
possibly the easiest step, but it is by no means guaranteed. Numerous proposals are 
defeated at any given convention, and no agreement is required. Four separate 
sections that have been considered for amendment by conventions remained 
unamended due to the delegates' inability to reach an agreement during the 1959 and 
1965 conventions.13 After the convention, if any agreements have been reached, one 
final obstacle remains for any proposed constitutional change. Approval by the voters 
by a simple majority makes the proposal an amendment. Even this portion has its 
difficulties, however, proven by one proposed amendment from the 1977 convention. 
The attempt at judicial reform passed by the convention delegates was unable to 
receive a simple majority ofvotes and was defeated by the general public. 14 
Though the convention method has proven to be the far more successful way 
of amending the Tennessee constitution, one can easily see the significant difficulty 
that exists in this convention process. Several examples of failure at every step of the 
convention method exist in Tennessee's history. Examples of failed legislative efforts 
for conventions, failed popular vote approvals, failed amendment proposals in 
12 Laska, The Tennessee State Constitution, 18-27. 
13 Tennessee Legislative Library Documents. 
14 Laska, The Tennessee State Constitution, 26. 
conventions, and even failed votes for amendment ratification all exist. These failures 
prove the difficulty of the convention half of the Tennessee amendment process. 
Tennessee's convention method of constitutional amendment, while difficult, 
does not approach the near impossibility of the legislative process. Once again, to 
understand the difficulty of amendment in Tennessee, one must examine each step of 
the process. Like all bills, a proposed amendment must go through the committee 
system. Any committee or subcommittee can pass or kill a possible amendment by a 
simple majority. Some proposed amendments may be subject to review by as many 
as three separate full committees in addition to subcommittees in the House of 
Representatives. Few bills, if any, other than amendments face such scrutiny in the 
committee system. One reason is that all amendments must be heard by the Judiciary 
Committee to review legal consequences, and they must also be heard by the Finance, 
Ways, and Means Committee due to the costs inherent in the publishing ofnotices 
and eventually the new constitution. This increased time in the committee system 
makes amendments much more susceptible to defeat than an average bilL Increased 
time in the committees increases chances that a proposed resolution may be defeated 
or receive undermining amendments. 
If it is able to escape the committee system, a resolution proposing an 
amendment reaches its next obstacle. Though all bills must meet a three-reading 
requirement, the first two readings on most bills are passed without the actual reading 
of the contents of the bill and are done before being referred to committee. For a 
proposed amendment it is much different. The entirety of the resolution is read aloud 
three separate times on three separate days to ensure all legislators are aware of the 
proposal. This reading takes place after the resolution's passage out of the committee 
system. While this sounds like a minor piece of the amendment process, it provides 
some of the biggest hurdles for amendments. During the span of three session days 
upon which the resolution is read, opponents of the bill have ample opportunity to 
attach hostile amendments. If an amendment is attached that changes the resolution, 
the resolution may be sent back to the committee system for approval again. This can 
lead to eventual defeat by a vote or simply defeat by prevention of the resolution from 
ever reaching a final vote on the floor. 
Once a resolution reaches a vote on the Senate and House floors, the simple 
majority vote that is required is one of the easiest tasks of the legislative amendment 
process. Even this step is by no means simple, however. It is not uncommon for a 
bill or resolution to be passed out of committee only to face defeat on a floor vote. 
On average, only one in three bills will be passed by the legislature. 15 Most bills are 
not subject to the difficulty ofextra committee and floor attention that an amendment 
resolution receives. As pointed out before, should a proposed constitutional 
amendment make it so far as to pass the simple majority vote of the first General 
Assembly, it is still less than halfway through difficulties it must face. 
A successfully passed resolution then must be published a minimum of six 
months prior to the election of the next General Assembly. This step allows for 
opponents and supporters to rally support for candidates on their particular side of a 
given issue. The division of support versus opposition is rarely balanced, however. 
In most cases, voters opposed to an issue are much more energetic, as was the case 
when legislators considered a state income tax. This step has yet to be a very large 
factor in the amendment process, but it has the potential to be in the future, especially 
with possible income tax amendments in the near future. Should an amendment be 
15 http://www.legislature.state.tn.us/, http://www.state.tn.us/sos/acts/index.htm 
proposed that sparks voters, it is very likely that a legislative body could shift enough 
during one election to counteract an attempt at amendment. 
After the election of the second General Assembly, the resolution proposing 
an amendment is subject to the committee system again. This once again provides 
ample opportunity for the proposal to be defeated in the same manner as before. Also 
like the first General Assembly, the three-reading requirement exists and creates 
hurdles. The difficulty is increased however, once the resolution reaches the floor for 
the second time. While the same simple majorities apply in committees, the second 
time on the floor requires the resolution to meet a super majority, which in Tennessee 
is a two-thirds vote. This is usually one of the true testing points for any proposed 
amendment. Though an amendment has faced a significant amount of difficulty prior 
to this stage, this step is likely the first occurrence in which the resolution must 
overcome party divisions in a serious way. As the General Assembly stands 
currently, the Democrats hold a seven-seat majority in the House and the Republicans 
hold a one-seat majority in the Senate. 16 With the houses split and the seat totals 
extremely close, bills and resolutions of any controversy already face a more difficult 
path for a simple majority, much less a super majority. 
Should a resolution pass with a two-thirds vote, it still must pass the 
ratification stage during the next gubernatorial election. This final obstacle has 
proven too difficult for multiple amendments in Tennessee's history. Most recently, 
the $50 fine amendment reached this stage. Placed on the 2002 gubernatorial ballot, 
the amendment proposal achieved a majority ofmore than 70,000 votes, but still 
failed. 17 The failure of the resolution to receive a majority of all citizens voting for 
governor tripped the amendment at the final hurdle. Other instances have occurred as 
16 http://www.legislature.state.tn.us/ 
17 http://www.state.tn.us/sos/electionlresultsI2002-11/amendments.pdf 
well. In 1940, an amendment to change the term of governor also received a solid 
majority, but failed to get the majority of votes cast in the general election. IS As in 
both these cases, the public can support a proposal but still fail to ratify an 
amendment. Due to Tennessee's style of amendment ratification, a voter's choice not 
to vote is the same as a nay vote. 
While no single requirement for amendment is too difficult, the accumulation 
of so many requirements compounds the difficulty. Though every process that 
Tennessee uses in its amendment processes is used by another state, no other state 
uses all of them. This combination of amendment restrictions makes Tennessee's 
constitution the most difficult to amend in the United States. The state constitution 
even surpasses the difficulty of the national amendment process. 
Why the Process Should Be Changed 
The overwhelming difficulty of the Tennessee amendment process causes two 
big problems. Each of these problems hinders the effective workings of government, 
especially the legislative branch. The first problem caused by the amendment 
difficulty is an upsetting of the state government's division of powers. The concepts 
of separation of powers and checks and balances are vital parts of state constitutions 
and the U.S. Constitution. Tennessee's amendment process thoroughly damages the 
legislative check upon the judiciary and, as a result, allows for legislative efforts of 
the courts to go unchecked. In addition to the negative effect that the amendment 
process has upon Tennessee's separation ofpowers, it also adversely affects the state 
legislature's ability to operate effectively in a more general manner. Combined with 
the bulky nature of the state constitution, a difficult amendment process can 
completely prevent an elected body from tending to matters best undertaken by 
18 Laska, The Tennessee State Constitution, 19. 
regular legislation. To fully understand the negative influence of the amendment 
process in these areas, however, a closer examination is required. 
Checks and balances and division ofpowers have been vital components in 
American constitutionalism. In The Federalist Papers 47,48, and 51, James Madison 
defended the American constitution's division ofpower and its procedures for each 
branch to adequately check the power ofeach other branch. These concepts are 
evident in state constitutions as well. In fact, Tennessee's present constitution 
deliberately states that there will be a distribution of powers vested in three distinct 
branches, in a sense codifying the concept of each branch's separateness. 19 As with 
the federal constitution, no branch is completely separate from the others, otherwise 
no checks and balances could be in place. 
Tennessee's system of checks and balances closely mimics that of the federal 
system. The chief concern when examining the effects of the state amendment 
process obviously deals with the checks and balances established between the state 
legislature and the state supreme court. As in the federal system, the courts have the 
power to interpret the laws and statutes of the legislature as well as the ability to rule 
such legislation unconstitutional. Though the legislature has a fair amount of control 
over the establishment of lesser courts, the checks that the legislature provides upon 
the Tennessee Supreme Court are through two means. 
The first method is through removal ofcourt judges. This check 011 the 
judiciary is provided in the case of improper actions by a judge. It is doubtful that a 
judge could or would be removed by the legislature for any action other than illegal or 
unethical behavior. Possibly removing a judge for his or her interpretation of the law 
19 Tennessee Constitutional Manual. Tennessee Department of State Division of Publications: 1978. 
threatens the very foundation of the judicial branch as separate from politics and 
would threaten the entire legal system. 
With this option likely reserved for only the most extreme circumstances, the 
legislature's one true check on the Tennessee Supreme Court rests with the ability to 
amend the constitution. This establishes a possible reverse check on the judiciary's 
ability to interpret the constitutionality ofa given matter. In the case of the federal 
system, this reverse check has been used on at least four occasions, resulting in five 
amendments. The Eleventh, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth and Twenty-Sixth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution have all been in response to Supreme Court 
decisions.20 Since the creation of Tennessee's present constitution, this reverse check 
due to a specific court decision has been used only twice. This first check on a 
judicial ruling came from one of the 1953 convention amendments. The legislature 
deleted the provision for the poll tax from the state constitution after the 1943 case 
Biggs v. Beeler ruled that a statutory attempt at poll tax repeal was unconstitutionaL 
The second time a ruling was overcome by amendment was during the 1972 
convention. This amendment did away with the constitutional provision setting 
certain rates of property assessment after the 1968 case of Louisville and Nashville 
Railway Co. v. Public Service Commission.21 
While Tennessee has shown itself capable of a legislative reverse check, there 
are some reasons for concern. First, Tennessee's constitution is similar to 
constitutions in many other states in that is overly concerned with specific matters 
best left to ordinary legislation. This additional bulkiness increases the matters that 
can be constitutionally interpreted. For this reason, one should expect a state 
constitution to allow for more legislative checks on the judiciary than the national 
20 Vile, John R. Encyclopedia o/Constitutional Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and Amending 

Issues, 1789-2002. 2nd edition. Denver: 2003. 

21 Laska, The Tennessee State Constitution. pgs 18-27. 

constitution. This is not the case in Tennessee, however. In the past 135 years, the 
state legislature has checked the state courts in this way twice, compared to Congress 
checking the Supreme Court four times in 216 years.22 
Another reason for concern about the extent of the state legislature's check on 
the jUdiciary concerns the manner in which it has occurred previously. Both times the 
General Assembly has successfully redefined the constitution in response to a court 
decision it has done so at a constitutional convention. While this may not appear as a 
great concern, one must take into account the state's reluctance to use the convention 
method. With the exception of the consecutive conventions from 1953 to 1977, they 
have been extremely rare in the state's history. This is due to a number of concerns 
previously mentioned. With such reluctance of the state as a whole to embrace a 
convention, the only method left for the legislature to check the courts is through the 
single amendment method. 
The single amendment method's immense difficulty makes even widely 
supported proposals nearly impossible to pass. An example would be Senate Joint 
Resolution 127 from the 2003-2004 General Assembly. This was an attempt by 
Senator David Fowler to check a ruling by the Tennessee Supreme Court from the 
1998 case Sundquist v. Planned Parenthood in which the right to an abortion was 
found protected by the state constitution despite no mention of abortion in the 1870 
document. Despite passing the Senate by a vote of 22 yeas to 6 nays and having a 
majority of the House members as sponsors of the resolution, it still failed to pass out 
of its first General Assembly, being defeated in a House Subcommittee. This is just 
one specific example of the legislature's failure to check the judiciary through the 
single amendment process. As can be seen by the fact that only four amendments 
22 Ibid. 
have ever made it through the single amendment process and the fact that conventions 
are extremely unlikely, there exists little to no current ability for a legislative check on 
the judiciary. 
Though this problem, to date, has largely remained a theoretical one, this 
could very well change in the near future. Many on the conservative side of the 
political spectrum are concerned by what they consider to be ')udicial activism." 
Legislators such as Senator Fowler feel that the increase in judicial legislation is 
evident in such decisions as Sundquist v. Planned Parenthood which he attempted to 
counteract through amendment. Other figures on the conservative side mirror Senator 
Fowler's view, such as Majority Leader Ron Ramsey. One chief concern about 
judicial activism was expressed by Senator Fowler who stated: "Every time the court 
effectively amends the constitution by itself, it undermines the democratic process. ,,23 
The possible increase in judicial activisnl also violates the very separation ofpowers 
so inherent in American political thought. As James Madison stated, "It is agreed on 
all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be 
directly and completely administered by either of the other departments. ,,24 If the 
courts are in effect amending the constitution without the legislature, they are indeed 
violating the division ofpowers between the courts and the legislature, whether for 
good or ill. 
The other end of the political spectrum, however, sees no such dangerous 
increase in judicial activity, or at least no danger in the increase of activity. One 
liberal legislator, Senator Steve Cohen, has stated his opinion that the courts are well 
within their jurisdiction ofpower. When asked ifjudicial activism was increasing, 
Cohen responded with a simple "no," but went on to state that the courts extend 
23 Personal Interviews with Senator David Fowler and Senator Ron Ramsey. February 24, 2005 
24 Madison, James. Federalist #48 
people's rights and opportunities. Despite their polar opposite political beliefs and 
opinions on the courts, both Senator Fowler and Cohen agree that the state 
amendment process is overly difficult and would benefit from a slight easing.25 
The second concern caused by difficulty of the amendment process is simply a 
hamstringing of the state legislature. Once again, the bulky nature of state 
constitutions comes into play when examining this problem. Prior to its amendments, 
Tennessee's constitution was one of the smallest in the country but was still over 
8,100 words.26 Numerous matters best left to everyday legislation were inserted into 
the state constitution. Some topics included legislator pay, property assessment rates, 
taxable items, and court fines. 
In the string of conventions from 1953 to 1977, many of these overly specific 
sections of the constitution were addressed and changed. The issue of legislative pay 
was taken care of by the 1953 and 1965 conventions. The 1971 convention was 
solely concerned with resolution of the property tax provisions in the constitution. 
Finally, the 1977 convention solved the restrictiveness of constitutional interest rates. 
Despite many of these problems being resolved, others still exist. 27 
One of the best examples of the constitutional amendment process hindering 
effective government concerns the $50 fine amendment. The state constitution states 
in Article VI, Section 14, that, "No fine shall be laid on any citizen of this State that 
shall exceed fifty dollars, unless it shall be assessed by a jury of his peers ... ,,28 Based 
upon inflation calculations, fifty dollars in 1913 would have the same purchasing 
power as $976.26 today.29 That figure for inflation does not even account for almost 
25 Personal Interviews with Senator David Fowler and Senator Steve Cohen. February 24, 2005. 

26 Howard, L. Vaughn and John H. Fenton. State Governments in the South: Functions and Problems. 

Tulane University: 1956. pIS. 

27 Laska, The Tennessee State Constitution. 18-27. 

28 http://www.state.tn.us/sosIb1uebookl online/tnconst.pdf 

29 http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm 

one-third of the time passage since the $50 fine provision was written into the 
constitution. The need to change this section of the constitution is widely accepted. 
A proposed amendment, as discussed before, made it to the final voter ratification and 
failed despite achieving a majority ofyes votes. 
Highly specific sections like Article VI, Section 14 are a detriment to state 
government. As state budgets grow, legislatures are increasingly looking for methods 
other than increasing taxes to pay for government services and programs. To 
maximize a legislature's effectiveness in funding while minimizing the increase to 
taxation, restrictions present in the constitution must be eliminated. The $50 fine 
section's inadequateness is an example of one area that hinders state government. 
Other restrictions best left to statute also exist. 
One section that has the potential to mimic the $50 fine provision's hindrance 
to the state is Article II, Section 30. It states, "No article manufactured of the produce 
of this State, shall be taxed otherwise than to pay inspection fees." This section 
leaves too much to be interpreted but is still specific enough to cripple possible 
taxation. Using the loosest definition, produce can be considered any agricultural 
product. Should a court of the state ever hear a case in regard to this provision, the 
combination of a loose definition ofproduce with a similar definition of the phrase 
" ... taxed otherwise than to pay inspection fees" could very well constitutionally limit 
the taxation of any product using a Tennessee agricultural good. Though Tennessee 
has a strong tie to agriculture that is likely the basis for such a provision, it again is an 
overly limiting factor best left to the statutory control of the General Assembly. 
New Amendment Process Proposal 
Solving the problems Tennessee has with its constitution can be greatly aided 
by a new amendment process. As I have pointed out, the difficulty of the current 
amendment process is excessive. When examining possible alternatives, however, 
one must be cautious not to ease the process too much. Oversimplification of the 
amendment process could also create problems. Instead ofcorrecting the bulkiness 
and overly specific areas of the constitution, an amendment process with too little 
difficulty could worsen the problem. Another significant problem deals with 
constitutional integrity. Should an amendment be as easily passed as ordinary 
legislation, it risks losing its validity as the supreme law. 
My proposal for a new constitutional amendment process takes into account 
the numerous methods used throughout the United States. The first issue I examined 
was Tennessee's method of ratification. This method is extremely unique and unfair. 
The vast majority of states require only that a majority vote on the amendment itself. 
Under Tennessee's present system, however, an amendment could receive a 
unanimous vote in its favor, but still fail to receive a majority of votes cast for 
governor. In my opinion, abstention from voting is just as much a freedom granted to 
voters as casting a vote in favor or opposition. As a result, the first change that I 
propose is a reduction in the difficulty of ratification. Requirement of a simple 
majority vote on the amendment should be an adequate form of ratification by the 
public. 
The second issue that I explored dealt with Tennessee's two legislature 
requirement. Few states require two legislatures to approve a proposed amendment. I 
agree with this measure, however. By requiring the approval ofmultiple legislatures, 
two main things are accomplished. First, more power is given to the electorate by 
giving them the chance to vote for or against candidates based upon proposed 
amendments. Second, this requirement gives time credibility to an amendment. It 
assures that a proposed change is thoroughly debated and not simply a reaction to the 
passions of the moment. 
The final issue I examined in regard to the amendment process was over the 
majorities required for passage in the legislatures. Under a single legislature 
requirement, approval by two-thirds of each house seems reasonable. Needing a 
super majority of that level along with a two session requirement seems excessive. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, a simple majority does not seem to preserve an 
adequate level of difficulty, even if done twice. My solution is to require a three­
fifths majority vote for both legislatures. 
This change accomplishes three things. First, it reduces the number of 
amendment proposals passing the first session, which saves money and legislative 
time. Second, it allows the members of the public a better opportunity to exercise 
their power under the two-session requirement. Voters have fewer issues to follow 
and are faced with the increased probability that an amendment will pass the second 
legislature. This should increasingly motivate voters. The final accomplishment of 
my proposal is a slight easing from the two-thirds requirement which helps balance 
the process's overall difficulty. 
Conclusion 
Tennessee's amendment process goes far beyond the necessary level of 
difficulty to the point of creating negative effects. Tennessee's legislature is 
hamstrung, and even the state's separation of powers is threatened by the difficulty of 
the state amendment process. Though no perfect solution exists, I believe Tennessee 
would benefit greatly from my proposed changes. My proposals moderate the 
difficulty of the amendment process but still preserve constitutional integrity. 
Hopefully with additional time and study, the state will effectively moderate the 
amendment process and solve the various problems attached to the current 
constitution. With such a difficult amendment process, however, Tennessee may have 
to endure its problenls for many years to conle. 
Amending Processes of Tennessee and 

State 
(year of 
constitution 
adoption) 
Tennessee 
(1870) 
Alabama 
(1901) 
Arkansas 
(1874) 
Georgia 
(1983) 
Kentucky 
(1891) 
Mississippi 
(1890) 
Missouri 
(1874) 
North 
Carolina 
(1971) 
Virginia 
(1971) 
Passage by 
First 
Legislature 
Majority 
of each 
majority of 
each house 
house 
3/5 
majority of 
each house 
Majority 
of each 
house 
Passage by 
Second 
Legislature 
2/3 
majority of 
each house 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
None 
Majority 
of each 
house 
Ratification 
by 
Electorate 
Majority of 
votes cast 
for 
Surrounding States 

Other 
Restrictions 
Ratification 
at 
gubernatorial 
elections only 
N/A 
Only 3 
proposals per 
election 
Ratification 
at general 
elections in 
even 
numbered 
years only 
Only 4 
proposals per 
election 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Convention 
lVIethod'? 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
(initiative 
method) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
